Just as important, the new boss will have to define Morgan Stanley's strategy.  it  has conventional wisdom that the investment bank erred in 1997 when it merged with Dean Witter, a retail broking and credit-card company. Returns on the Dean Witter end of the business are poor, and Mr Purcell said recently that the credit-card business would be spun off. Yet Mr Purcell considered himself a strategic visionary who saw the value of broadening the distribution of financial products. At Sears, Roebuck, a retailer, he started the Discover credit card and tried to combine the sale of “socks and stocks” by buying a retail broker, Dean Witter. Having failed to make the strategy work at Sears, he carried it over into Dean Witter's merger with Morgan Stanley, reasoning that linking the underwriting of securities with their sale to the public had to have some value.
重要的是,新老板不得不明确摩根士坦利的战略。1997年，当摩根士坦利收购证券信用卡公司Dean Witter的时候，犯了常识性(众所周知from alas 老爷)的错误。 Dean Witter 关门时候的业绩是很糟糕的，但是Purcell最近说信用卡业务应该可以独立出来(Purcell最近说要把信用卡业务独立出去)。然而，Purcell自己认为这是一个很有前景的战略，因为它看到了扩大金融产品销售所带来的价值。Sears公司的一位基金经理人Roebuck(Purcell在Sears Roebuck证券公司from alas 老爷)，他从尝试Discover信用卡业务开始，然后通过收购证券公司Deann Witter来整合“socks and stocks”的销售。Purcell在Sears的战略失败以后，他又把这种策略带入了Dean Witter与摩根士坦利的兼并之中，因为它认为将做市商与他面向公众的销售捆绑必定会有一些价值。
Arguably, after the merger, profits from Dean Witter provided money for Morgan Stanley's investment-banking businesses. These days, though, it is the investment bank that makes the money. A question left unanswered is whether the combination failed because the two parts were simply incompatible—as the firm's disgruntled alumni believe—or because of poor management. Only in the past two months, under Ms Cruz and Mr Crawford, has full integration begun.
具有争议的是，在那次购并后，来自Dean Witter的利润一直向摩根斯坦利的投资银行业务注入资金。尽管，这段时间，赚钱的确是投资银行部门。一个无法解答的问题就是，这次并购为何会失败？是和公司中那些不满的出逃者认为的那样,这两个部分简直不可不调和的，还是因为糟糕的管理？仅仅在2个月前，在Cruz和Crawford的操作下，才开始这两个部分的完全整合。
Difficult decisions have yet to be made about which businesses fit together and which do not. For example, Dean Witter's strategy of offering mutual funds managed by many advisers as well as in-house products has attracted outrage and litigation; then again, a large sales force helps distribution. Awkwardly, the better the argument for keeping the firm broad, the better the case for joining forces with a retail and commercial bank. The names most cited are HSBC and Bank of America. The top executives at Morgan Stanley oppose this, but whether they can avoid a takeover may come down to how well they operate without Mr Purcell. The sooner he leaves, the sooner the test begins.
 在决定哪些业务适合整合那些业务部适合的问题上，也是新任的CEO必须做出的艰难抉择。例如，由很多咨询顾问管理的共同基金和内部产品的整合就引起了不满和法律诉讼；后来，一支庞大的销售力量再次将两者分开。最笨的办法就是，公司越是收缩战线，个人银行与商业银行业务的整合就越好。在这方面，被人引用最多的案例就是汇丰银行和美国银行。然而摩根士坦利的最高管理层持反对态度，不过在没有Puerll的情况下他们自身的运作能否避免让下一个继任者失望呢？他越早离开，这一系列的尝试就会越早的进行。

So, what's plan B?
那么，紧急预案是什么？
Morgan Stanley's share price jumped on the news of Mr Purcell's departure, but enthusiasm then petered out. The way ahead is anything but clear. There is no heir apparent. It thus seems that neither of the two highly regarded co-presidents he appointed recently, Zoe Cruz and Stephen Crawford, is yet thought ready to lead the firm. Morgan Stanley also indicated that none of the executives who have departed recently would be invited back to take the top job. It appears, therefore that none of the people who know the firm best is in the running. The uncertainty about the succession may give some employees a good incentive to choose their own boss, at another firm, rather than wait to see who Morgan Stanley's board chooses for them. And the rebel alumni may yet try to cause trouble for the board.
  摩根士坦利的股价很快就盖过了Purcell的辞职消息(当Purcell辞职的消息不胫而走之时 摩根士坦利的股价一度跳高，from alas 老爷)，但是狂热已经消退。前方的道路甚不明朗。Purcell的继位者的影子都看不见(众望所归的继位者还没影，from alas老爷)。最近被提名的两位副主席Zoe Cruz和Stephen Crawford，似乎都被认为还没有准备好领导这个公司。摩根斯坦利同时也指出，他们不会邀请最近离职的管理人员来担当这个首脑职务。很显然，那些最了解公司人员都不太有机会胜出。继位者问题上的不确定性，可能刺激很多员工去其他公司选择他们的老板，而不是观望摩根士坦利的董事会为自己选一个老板。这些即将离开的叛逃者很可能想要给董事会制造一些麻烦。

Morgan Stanley's instability has been a joy to watch for competing firms, who have enjoyed the way Mr Purcell has run what was once the most prominent franchise on Wall Street. Some rivals have been able to poach experienced, talented people. And the lists of departing Morgan Stanleyites in the newspapers have drawn attention away from their own troubles.
摩根士坦利的混乱被它的竞争对手当作笑话看。摩根士坦利在华尔街翻云覆雨的影响力在Purcell操纵下，成为了它的同行们的笑柄。一些竞争对手已经在私低下招募，那些有经验有能力的人。摩根士坦利员工的离职名单出现在报纸上的时候，这个公司的其他问题就显的无足轻重了。

To be sure, some of those departing have overblown reputations and others are merely pretending to have left, having in fact been fired. Still, many were valuable. Fitch, a credit-rating agency, voiced “dismay” at the stream of departures in reaffirming its negative outlook after the news of Mr Purcell's departure. None of the big Wall Street firms that have faltered in the past two decades—Dillon Read, Drexel Burnham Lambert, E.F. Hutton, Salomon Brothers and Kidder Peabody—did so because the competition roasted them. For one reason or another, all imploded. Even the strongest firm is a delicate combination of flighty clients and flightier talent. Morgan Stanley is highly profitable, and looks far from catastrophe. And yet investment banks can unravel rapidly.
  很明显，在那些辞职的人员中，有一些是为了出名，还有一些为了掩盖炒鱿鱼的事实而假装辞职的家伙。然而，还是有很多人是非常有价值的。在Purcell的辞职新闻发布之后，一位信用等级评估师(一个信用等级评估公司 from alas 老爷)，Fitch重申了这个公司悲观的前景，他说离职的大潮令人大失所望。过去20年里，Dillon Read, Drexel Burnham Lambert, E.F. Hutton, Salomon Brothers and Kidder Peabody，这些华尔街公司都曾有过动荡不安的时候。但是因为市场的竞争在鞭策着他们，没有哪一个像摩根士坦利这样(但是他们没有哪一个像摩根士坦利这样做，因为他们想这样做之前竞争对手就消灭了他们 from alas 老爷)。由于这样那样的原因,这家公司内部已经崩溃。甚至这家最强大的公司是构建在头脑发热的客户和更为疯狂的天才身上。摩根士坦利有很强的盈利能力，也能从困境中看到未来。但是投资银行的分崩离析是在眨眼之间的事情。

Whoever takes Mr Purcell's place will have to be capable of halting the defections. That requires not just the support of the board (Mr Purcell enjoyed that in spades) but the confidence of the investment bankers. The ideal candidate would be able to understand arcane trading strategies, charm clients and satisfy giant egos more cheaply than competitors could. Few are born with these qualities, and no management training programme exists.
 无论谁接替Purcell的职位，他都必须要有能力阻止人员的流失。这不仅仅需要董事会的支持(Purcell在这方玩的太过火了)而且需要投资银行家的信心。理想的候选人要懂得古老的生意策略(理想的候选人要懂得商业战略的奥义,from alas 老爷)，要比竞争对手用更低的成本去讨好客户，去维持这个巨人的自身发展(要比竞争对手开出更少的工资但还能留住人才,from alas 老爷)。很少有人具有这种天赋，而且想学也学不来(而且这些都是书本之外的功夫,from alas 老爷)。

To be Continue......

Morgan Stanley
摩根士坦利
UnfulPhilled

权利真空

Jun 16th 2005 | NEW YORK
From The Economist print edition

A long campaign of criticism has toppled Philip Purcell, Morgan Stanley's chief executive. Where next for the Wall Street firm?
 在长期的批评与声讨中，摩根斯坦利的CEO Philip Purcell终于被迫下台。这家华尔街银行将走向何方呢?

FITTINGLY, the departure of Philip Purcell from the chief executive's job at Morgan Stanley is creating as much muddle as his tenure. On June 13th, Mr Purcell announced what many shareholders and remaining employees had desperately wanted to hear: he was going. The cheers were muted, however, by the vagueness about when: sometime before the annual shareholders' meeting next spring, after his successor has been appointed.

   恰当的说，Philip Purchell辞去CEO职位在摩根斯坦利中正酿成的混乱并不比他在位期间好多少。6月13日，Purchell宣布了一项令众多股东和员工们迫不及待想要听到的声明:他要滚蛋了。然而，在时间表上的模糊不清令欢庆之声陷于沉寂。他离职的具体时间可能是在他的继任者被确定之后到明年春天年度股东大会之前的某一天。

Pressure on Mr Purcell—and Morgan Stanley's hitherto slavishly supportive board—had been mounting for months. A group of former executives had been calling for his head, especially loudly since a series of reorganisations led to the departure of five members of the firm's management committee. Institutional investors and hedge funds shorting its shares saw incompetence; those buying smelled blood. The firm's long-term financial performance, while not bad, has been worse than those of its primary competitors. Defections were all too frequent. Its bellicose legal strategy, run by a close associate of Mr Purcell's, recently yielded a $1.5 billion court defeat that had far less to do with the merits of the claims against the bank than with a judge's perception that its defence hinged on burying evidence.

几个月以来,Purchell 与唯唯诺诺的摩根士坦利现任董事会身上的压力不断的增加。自从一系列重组导致该公司五个管理委员会成员离职之后，一批先前的主管不断的大声质问他们的上司。减持摩根斯坦利的机构投资者与对冲基金看到他的无能;而那些持仓的客户则闻到了血腥味。该公司的长期财务状况，虽然不坏，但是要比他们主要的竞争对手糟糕的多。而人员的流失更是家常便饭。Purcell的一位助理实行的进攻性法律战略，最近招致了1500万美元的败诉。这场诉讼中很辩词被法官认定是隐瞒证据，而对该公司权益的伸张却少的多。(由Purcell的一位亲信坐阵的法律行动最近遭致了15亿美元的惨败。这场斗气十足的法律行动的失败与其说这是由于被告的赔偿要求理由充分，不如说是因为法官认定他们隐瞒了证据。From alas老爷 )

None of this might have mattered. Investment banks routinely go through times when they lose a lot of good people. Goldman Sachs has seen perhaps 70% of its partners go since its initial public offering in 1999, including two putative successors to its current chief executive. Merrill Lynch turned over its entire management in late 2001. Mr Purcell, though, could not staunch the loss of disaffected employees or silence the carping about his strategy.

 这些东西可能并不是问题。流失大量的优秀员工，是投行经常会遇到的情况。高盛自1999年以来因为他的初始公开收购而导致他70%的合伙人离开，其中包括两个被认为是目前CEO的接班人。美林银行在2001年末全盘更换了他的管理层。不过，Purcell即不可能阻止那些不满的员工的流失，也难以平息对他政策的批评。

His fate may have been sealed by two minor events: an uninspired presentation to investors on May 10th that raised doubts about his vision and strategy; and this week's warning about disappointing second-quarter profits. Unhelpfully good results from Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, reported after Mr Purcell said he was on his way, served only to point up Morgan Stanley's relative failings.

 两件小事情决定了Purcell的命运:5月10日一场对投资人毫无吸引力的演讲，以及，这周关于第二季度盈利的预警，引起了人们对他的远景和战略的怀疑。在Purchell宣布辞职之后，来自莱曼兄弟和贝尔史登报告中的利好消息也无毫无帮助。它们的报告仅仅被用来指出摩根士坦利的相关的失误。(Purchell宣布辞职之后莱曼兄弟和贝尔史登两家公司的利好消息对他也毫无帮助--它们只能映照出摩根士坦利的失败之处。from alas 老爷)

To be continue....

Stagflation, the remix
滞胀，通胀与萧条的混音

May 5th 2005
From The Economist print edition

It's not the 1970s, but the modern version could prove equally tricky
这不是20世纪70年代，但是现代版的滞胀或许同样的棘手

LIKE the disco era it dominated, stagflation has a distinctive beat: slow growth, rising inflation, high oil prices and weak labour markets. In the 1970s this nasty combination haunted the global economy. Could it be making a comeback?
 就如那迪斯科流行的年代，滞胀也曾经拥有与众不同的节拍:低增长，高通胀；高企的油价，疲软的劳动力市场。在20世纪70年代，他们一搭一挡折腾着整个世界经济。今天他还会回来么？
Today's world economy does seem to be playing some similar tunes. In the statement accompanying its latest interest-rate hike on May 3rd, America's Federal Reserve fretted about both price pressure and a slowdown in spending. On May 4th, the European Central Bank kept interest rates unchanged, but worried aloud about oil prices and slowing growth.
 今日的世界经济好似也弥散着同样的音调。伴随着5月3日最近一次的升息，物价压力和消费的放缓把美联储搞的焦头烂额。在5月4日，欧洲央行保持利率不变，但是油价和低增长却是他们的心头大患。
The evidence is mounting that global growth has slowed. In America, output grew by an annualised 3.1% in the first three months of 2005, the slowest pace for two years. More recent figures, from weak retail sales to soggy consumer confidence, suggest this “soft patch” may be getting softer by the day. In Britain, the latest numbers—in retail sales and manufacturing—point to weaker growth. And in the euro zone, sluggish economies are looking ever more lethargic.
所有的数据都直指全球经济的疲软。在美国，2005年头三个月按年度计算产出增长了3.1%,这是两年来的最低水平。从疲软的零售指数到低迷的消费者信心指数,这些更新的数据都暗示着这场局部疲软可能会愈演愈烈。在英国，最新的零售和工业数据显示趋于更加缓慢的增长。在欧元区，低迷的经济从来没有这样让人昏昏欲睡。
 
Yet even as growth is slowing, price pressures are looming. In America, consumer prices rose 3.1% in the year to March, up from 1.7% a year ago. In Britain, inflation jumped unexpectedly in March. And in the euro zone, consumer prices are still rising faster than the 2% goal that the European Central Bank targets. With output slowing and inflation stubborn, it is small wonder that the concerns about stagflation are back in fashion.
 然而即使增长疲软，物价压力却正在逐步显现。在美国，消费物价从去年到今年三月攀升了3.1%，比去年增长了1.7%。在英国，3月份通胀意外的跳高。在欧元区，消费指数串升依然要比欧洲央行设定的2%目标快的多。随着产出的疲软和持续的通胀，对于滞胀再次回归的担忧并不出人意料。

In fact, today's version of stagflation bears scant resemblance to the 1970s. In 1979, for instance, America's core inflation, which excludes oil and food, was rising at over 7% a year, while the economy grew barely more than 1%. Recent core inflation, at 2.2%, is only just above the central bank's comfort zone, while GDP growth is pretty close to the economy's sustainable rate. There is a tad of “flation”, in other words, but not much sign of “stag”. The euro zone, by contrast, has plenty of stagnation, but—despite the ECB's nervousness—there is little sign that its inflation is getting out of control .
实际上，这次的滞胀与70年代的不太相同。1979年，美国核心通胀(排除油价和食品),每年上涨超过7%，当时经济增长仅仅高出1%.当年的核心的通胀为2.2%，这仅仅刚刚超过央行的合理区间。与此同时GDP增长与经济可持续增长率非常接近。换一种说法就是，通胀是微量，但是疲软确十分明显。但是欧元区也正好相反，尽管ECB极度担心，但是在极度疲软的情况下,并没有迹象表明通胀正在失去控制。

to be continue...

Oil Prices The bears appear
油价!熊市显现

Apr 14th 2005
From The Economist print edition

The oil market softens a bit
石油市场趋于疲软

IT MAY seem absurd to ask, but has the price of oil peaked? Only last week, the price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) breached $58 a barrel for the first time. Goldman Sachs, an investment bank, gave warning recently that “super-spikes” of $100-plus might come. Yet there has been plenty of bearish talk too. This week, the bears were having their way, as the price of WTI slid back towards $50.
油价见顶了吗？这似乎是一个荒谬的问题。就在上周，西德州中级原油价格首次突破58美元一桶。高盛最近预警可能出现超过100美元的超级峰顶。然而市场看空气氛浓厚。这周，熊市如期而致，西德州中级原油价格滑落到50美元一桶。

Their case rests on three arguments. First, fundamentals. On the demand side, Chinese oil consumption is slowing at last. The International Energy Agency (IEA) says that in January and February, Chinese demand was only 5.4% greater than a year before, having risen by 20.8% in the year to early 2004. Supply is rising too: the output of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) rose by 300,000 barrels per day in March, estimates the IEA. With stocks also growing, the agency concludes, “there seems less reason for concern.”
 这波行情主与三个因素密切相关。首先，是基本面。在需求方面，最近中国石油消费正在放缓。国际能源组织说，1到2月份，中国石油需求仅比去年高出5.4%，而在2004年则上升了20.8%。供应方面也在上升:据IEA估计，欧佩克的产量在三月份调高到每天三百万桶。随着股市的持续上扬，该组织断定"没有理由过分担心"。

Second, the market is in “contango”—meaning that the spot price is below the forward price (see chart). In bull markets, this is often a sign that prices are on the turn. Oil stocks are likely to rise, because purchasers will load up at today's lower prices rather than wait, thereby easing prices in a few months' time. Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, recently cited the contango as a reason why he was relaxed about oil prices.
第二，市场正处于升水("contango")——意味着远期价格低于近期价格(见图)。在牛市中，这经常是价格逆转的信号。石油股也能走高，因为买方将会在今天更低的价格上建仓而不是选择等待，因此未来几个月里价格会持续走低。联储主席，艾伦.格林斯潘，最近引用期货市场升水作为他不担心油价的一个原因

The third and most contentious argument concerns speculators. Official data suggest that the net long positions (in effect, bets on higher prices) held by non-commercial investors are the largest for a year. Hedge funds have long been blamed for pushing up prices. But it seems that pension funds, which used to regard direct exposure to oil as too risky, are joining in.
第三，也是最有争议的因素就是对于投机者的担心。官方数据显示非商业投资者的长盘净额(实际上是在投机更高的价格)是一年以来最大的。很长时间以来对冲基金一直被责备是推高油价的因素。但是以前一直被认为介入石油市场存在过大风险的养老基金，似乎正在进场。

In the past year or so, seeking fatter returns than on shares and bonds, they have piled in, helped by structured products that were pioneered by Goldman Sachs and linked to commodity indices run by Goldman, Morgan Stanley and others. Simply put, every month investors sell spot and buy one month forward. Some blame this device for pushing the market into contango.
过去一年，为了在证券和债券上寻求更为丰厚的汇报，他们通过结构性产品的帮助进入这个市场。高盛在结构性产品是行业的领先者，而且结构性产品与高盛，摩根士坦利运行的商品期货指数息息相关。简而言之，每个月这些投资者卖出远期购入一个月的近期。一些人谴责这种将市场推向升水的做法。

Goldman vigorously denies this. The bank's Jeffrey Currie estimates that pension funds, hedge funds and others, even combined, cannot shift the oil price by more than about $7 a barrel. Philip Verleger, an energy economist, is not so sure. He thinks that the scale of pension-fund investment could be far higher than Goldman believes, and worries that this inflow could be inflating a bubble.
高盛竭力否认这件事情。高盛银行的Jeffrey Currie估计，对冲基金，养老基金以及其他的资金，即使加起来也不可能造成石油价格每桶7美元上下的波动。能源经济学家，Philip Verleger，不这么认为。他认为对冲基金投资的放大效应可能要比高盛想象的大得多，他担心这些资金的进场将会引发一场泡沫。

In essence, he says, the new investment is a huge bet on higher oil prices. The trouble is that there are not enough sellers in the futures market. Oil-producing countries and oil companies dislike hedging against rising prices. So do many institutional investors, who buy oil shares precisely for exposure to rising prices.
他说，实际上新的投资只是在豪赌油价继续上扬。然而麻烦的是在未来的市场上没有足够的购买者。石油生产国和石油公司不愿意阻止油价升高。而且机构投资者也不愿意这样做，他们购买了石油股份就是为了要从油价的上扬中受益。

For all that, a crash remains unlikely, and there may be more upward spikes. But there is a lot of froth. If the fundamentals erode faster than expected, prices could fall sharply as speculators rush out. Investors are in for a bumpy ride.
  基于上述原因，崩盘仍然是不可能的，可能还有更多的峰顶。但是存在着大量的泡沫。如果基本面变化的要比预期的快，油价可能因为投机者推出而大跌。

The oil price soars, again
Mar 10th 2005

Yuan at a time
 人民币正在关键时刻

The Chinese have tried to offset the recent upward pressure on the yuan by easing controls on capital outflows, for instance by allowing firms to invest abroad. While this is in line with the eventual objective of full capital-account liberalisation, it runs the risk of getting reforms in the wrong order. An easing of controls on outflows may even be counterproductive if it stimulates larger inflows. By making it easier to take money out of the country, investors may be enticed to bring more in.
  中国尝试通过废除在资本外流上的管制，例如允许公司去境外投资，来弥补最近人民币日趋上升的压力。当开放资本账户这一最终目标随着这种做法日益明朗时，中国也正是在这种本末倒置的改革上铤而走险。如果资本管制的废除刺激庞大游资进入的话，那么这项政策就起了反作用。在资本外流越来越方便的同时，可能诱使更多投资者进入。

Capital controls are not watertight. So although China will continue to be protected from international flows, its controls can be evaded through the under- or over-invoicing of trade. Multinationals can also use transfer prices (the prices at which internal transactions are accounted for) to dodge the rules. Despite extensive controls, a lot of capital left China during the Asian crisis in the late 1990s; recently, lots of short-term money has flowed in. Controls are likely to become even more porous as China becomes more integrated into the global economy. Thus, waiting for speculative and other inflows to ease before changing the exchange-rate regime might not be a fruitful strategy.
 资本管制并不是一个水龙头。因此尽管目前资本管制仍然保护着中国不受国际游资侵害，但是投资者仍然能够通过高报或者低报进口来逃避这种资本管制。跨国公司也能通过使用转让价格(内部转让时的记账价格)来规避这种管制。尽管管制成本高昂，但是在90年代的亚洲金融危机仍然有很多资本撤离中国；最近流入了很多短期资本。当中国与国际接轨越来越紧密的时候，资本管制可能变得越来越容易渗透。因此在改变汇率政策之前坐等投机资本的消失，可能不是一个好主意。

China ought to move to a flexible exchange rate soon, while its capital controls still work. Experience also suggests that it is best to loosen the reins on a currency when growth is strong and the external account is in surplus. China should take advantage of today's opportunity rather than being forced into change at a much less convenient time.
在中国的资本管制仍然起作用的时候，中国应该尽快走向一个自由的汇率机制。过去的经验也认为当经济增长强劲国外收支帐户处于盈余的情况下，最好的办法就是松绑货币。中国应该利用今天的优势而不是在将来兵临城下之时签定城下之盟。